

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----141314Z 001653 /41

R 141220Z MAY 77
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6067
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ABU DHABI 1423

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS : PFOR, SY, US, XF, TC
SUBJECT : PRESIDENT CARTER'S MEETING WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD

REF: SECTO 4023

1. DURING MEETING MAY 14 WITH MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAIF GHUBBASH TO DISCUSS SEVERAL SUBJECTS, I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW IN DETAIL PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ASAD USING TALKING POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL. GHUBBASH WAS KEENLY INTERESTED TAKING COPIOUS NOTES AND ASKING NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. TALKING POINTS WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL SINCE THEY PROVIDED AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF PRESENT GROUND OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND MIDDLE EAST LEADERS AND ARE SUPPORTIVE OF OUR EFFORTS TO MAKE UAE LEADERSHIP FEEL THAT IT IS RECEIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION BECAUSE OF ITS
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MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY ON ECONOMIC AND ENERGY MATTERS. RECEIPT OF MESSAGE AT THIS TIME ALSO HELPFUL SINCE IT COMES WHEN LOCAL PRESS GIVING HEAVY PLAY TO STORIES THAT US ADMINISTRATION IS CAVING TO CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES TO GIVE ISRAEL SPECIAL ARMS SUPPLY TREATMENT INCLUDING CO-PRODUCTION OF MOST ADVANCED MILITARY WEAPONS.

2. GHUBBASH FELT THAT ARABS UNDERSTAND WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER MEANS WHEN TALKS ABOUT NATURE OF PEACE. GHUBBASH BELIEVED THIS WILL NATURALLY COME ABOUT IF ARABS HAVE CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT BORDERS WILL LOOK LIKE, WHAT ACCESS THERE WILL BE TO JERUSALEM, AND WHAT KIND OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE. WHAT CONCERNED HIM WAS THAT ISRAEL WAS INSISTING IN ADVANCE ON DEFINITION OF PEACE BEFORE INDICATING WHAT IT IS PREPARED TO GIVE. CLEARLY, THIS CAN NOT BE A ONE-SIDED OPERATION. HE AGREED WITH PRESIDENT MWVP DV VIEW, WHICH HE FELT REFLECTED OPINION OF MODERATE ARABS, THAT SECURE BORDERS IN TERRITORIAL TERMS MEANT NOTHING BECAUSE SECURE BORDERS COULD ONLY BE ESTABLISHED ONCE ISRAELIS AND ARABS DECIDED THAT WAR WAS NO LONGER VIABLE OPTION.

3. GHUBBASH ALSO FELT PLO UNLIKELY TO BE VERY FORTHCOMING UNTIL IT TOO HAS A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT NATURE OF PEACE IS GOING TO BE. SEEING ITS ACTIVITIES CURTAILED IN ARAB WORLD AND UNCERTAIN WHAT NATURE OF PALESTINIAN HOMELAND LIKELY TO BE, IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR PLO LEADERSHIP AT THIS TIME TO ACCEPT PUBLICLY EITHER UNRES 242 OR EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S REPEATED REFERENCES IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT US RECOGNIZES PALESTINIANS DESERVE A HOMELAND WERE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. MORE PRECISE THESE STATEMENTS COULD BECOME, THE MORE PRESSURE IT PLACED ON PLO TO MOVE TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF UNRES 242. WHILE HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR PLO, AND WAS GIVING ONLY HIS PERSONAL VIEWS, GHUBBASH FELT FROM MANY CONTACTS UAE HAS HAD WITH PLO GROUPS THAT MODERATE ELEMENTS SECRET

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THEREIN ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN A PALESTINIAN (OR PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN STATE) AND A STATE OF ISRAEL.

4. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION, GHUBBASH ITERATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HIS CONCERN THAT CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO GIVE ISRAEL SPECIAL ACCESS TO US WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY COULD NOW UNDERCUT WHAT ADMINISTRATION IS TRYING TO DO IN MIDDLE EAST. TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY WITH ISRAEL FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WAS PERFECTLY UNDERSTANDABLE BUT CO-PRODUCTION OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY ARMAMENTS WAS QUITE A DIFFERENT THING. IT WAS EASIER FOR THE ARABS TO STMOACH US ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL THAN CO-PRODUCTION WHICH WOULD INTRODUCE AN ENTIRELY NEW AND DANGEROUS ELEMENT FOR ANY MIDDLE EAST PEACE. IT WOULD ONLY STIMULATE ARAB HAWKS TO DEMAND THE SAME THING, THEREBY DIVERTING BADLY NEEDED RESOURCES AWAY FROM PEACEFUL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. IT WOULD ALSO STIMULATE ARAB IMAGINATIONS THAT US TECHNOLOGY COULD BE USED FOR EVEN MORE DANGEROUS WEAPONS INVOLVING HIGHEST TECHNOLOGY (READ NUCLEAR). ISRAEL ALREADY HAD BY

FAR STRONGEST AND MOST TECHNOLOGICALLY DEVELOPED ARMS INDUSTRY IN MIDDLE EAST. IF ISRAEL AND US WANTED TO GAIN ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF A STATE OF PEACE IN REGION, THEY COULD NOT EXPECT THAT CO-PRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY ARABS WITHOUT A REACTION. MOREOVER, IT SEEMED INCONSISTENT WITH ADMINISTRATION'S AVOWED EFFORTS TO CONTROL INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, A POLICY WHICH GHUBBASH SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTS.

NOTE BY OC/T: PARA 2 AS RECEIVED.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----142021Z 005144 /73

R 141220Z MAY 77
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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AMEMBASSY DOHA
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 ABU DHABI 1423

EXDIS

5. I TOLD GHUBBASH THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON QUESTION OF CO-PRODUCTION. HOWEVER, I DID GIVE HIM EXCERPT OF ARTICLE IN WASHINGTON STAR WRITTEN BY VERNON GUIDRY CARRIED IN MAY 13 WIRELESS FILE. ARTICLE STATES THAT SENATORS CASE AND HUMPHREY HAVE AGREED TO DROP THEIR AMENDMENT TO FSA WHICH WOULD HAVE AUTHORIZED CO-PRODUCTION AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM. ARTICLE QUOTES PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM AS STATING THAT PRESIDENT RESERVES HIS AUTHORITY TO APPLY ARMS SALES RE-

STRAINT EXCEPT WHERE HE DETERMINES THAT "COUNTRIES FRIENDLY
TO THE US MUST DEPEND ON ADVANCED WEAPONRY TO OFFSET QUANTITATIVE
AND OTHER DISADVANTAGES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A REGIONAL BALANCE."
DICKMAN

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Message Attributes

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Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
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Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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